An ambitious explicit ethical theory, Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency, is mechanized on the computer. Utilizing Church's type theory as meta-logic to semantically embed a rich combination of expressive non-classical logics as required for the task, our work pushes existing boundaries in knowledge representation and reasoning. We demonstrate that intuitive encodings of ambitious ethical theories and their mechanization, resp. automation, on the computer are no longer antipodes.
Introduction
Hybrid architectures for ethical autonomous agents that integrate both bottom-up learning and topdown deliberation from upper principles are receiving increased attention (cf. [Dignum, 2018; Dignum, 2017; Scheutz, 2017; Malle, 2016; Dennis et al., 2016; Anderson and Anderson, 2014; Wallach et al., 2008] and the references therein).
Irrespective of the preferred direction it is becoming increasingly evident that adequate explicit representations of ethical knowledge are beneficial, if not mandatory, to obtain satisfactory solutions. Bottom-up approaches may benefit from expressive languages to explicitly represent the learned ethical knowledge in an scrutable, communicable and transferable manner. Top-down approaches usually rely on expressive logic languages to enable an intuitive and accurate representation and reasoning with ethical theories. Unfortunately, however, very few approaches are currently available that enable adequate and realistic, explicit formal encodings of non-trivialized ethical theories, and that at the same time support intuitive interactive-automated reasoning with them.
In this paper we demonstrate a methodology and implementation of such an ambitious ethical reasoning machinery. Our approach is based on classical higher-order logic (HOL, aka Church's type theory) [Andrews, 2018] , which we exploit as a meta-logic to encode combinations of non-classical logics for normative reasoning as suited for a given application context. The methodology and techniques we present can * Funded by VolkswagenFoundation under project CRAP. bring many benefits to the design of ethically-critical systems aiming at scrutability, verifiability, and the ability to provide justification for its decision-making. They are particularly relevant to the area of explicit ethical agents [Moor, 2009] .
As expected, the design of explicit ethical agents is faced with tough philosophical and practical challenges. No consensus is currently in sight, if possible at all, concerning the choice of upper moral values and principles that constitute a generally agreed normative ethics for intelligent autonomous agents. For example, utilitarianism and deontology have both been critically discussed in this context. [Gewirth, 1981; Beyleveld, 1991] , which he proposed as an emendation of the Golden Rule. Our aim is not to defend or assess Gewirth's work in comparison to other approaches (this could be an objective of future work though). What we instead present is a methodology and technique enabling the intuitive and accurate representation of ambitious ethical theories, and for this we take Gewirth's prominent PGC as an illustrative showcase and exemplarily assess its logical validity with our automated reasoning machinery. Such an ambitious ethical theory has never before been adequately and intuitively formalized and assessed on the computer at such a level of detail (i.e. without trivializing it by abstraction means).
In this paper we exemplarily study another relevant and ambitious theory in normative ethics: Alan Gewirth's "Principle of Generic Consistency (PCC)"
Our method enables the reuse of modern interactive and automated higher-order theorem proving technology, and in this sense it establishes a relevant bridge between different research communities. On a practical level our work also addresses what we consider one of the biggest challenges in the area: to represent complex ethical theories in both a machine and human interpretable manner and to carry out complex reasoning in real-time with incomplete and inconsistent information. And finally, as a side-effect, we have revealed and fixed some (minor) issues in Gewirth's PGC.
Our choice of HOL at the meta-level is motivated by the goal of flexibly combining different expressive non-classical logics as required for the formal encoding of complex ethical theories. Current theories in normative and machine ethics are, quite understandably, formulated predominantly in natural language. While this supports human deliberation and agreement about what kind of moral beings we want future intelligent agents to become, it also hampers their implementation in machines. For the latter expressive formal languages are required, which in particular enable flexible combinations of different types of non-classical logics. This is because ethical theories are usually challenged by complex linguistic expressions, including modalities (alethic, epistemic, temporal, etc.), counterfactual conditionals, generalized quantifiers, (un-)conditional obligations, among many others.
The meta-logical approach we exploit and demonstrate grounds on a technique known as (shallow) semantical embedding. The approach will be addressed in §2, where we present an extended embedding of a dyadic deontic logic (DDL) [Carmo and Jones, 2002] in HOL and combine, among others, conditional obligations with further modalities and quantifiers. The combined logic is immune to known paradoxes in deontic logic, in particular, the so-called contrary-to-duty scenarios, in which a 'secondary' obligation must come into effect when a 'primary' obligation is violated (contradicted). Moreover, conditional (dyadic) obligations in DDL are of a defeasible and paraconsistent nature and thus lend themselves to normative reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent information. In §3 and §4 we will represent and formally assess Gewirth's ethical theory using this expressive logic combination. We also demonstrate how our technique has been utilized to reveal and fix some (minor) issues in Gewirth's work. Since there is no other practically available approach known to us that can mechanize Gewirth's PGC on the computer, we cannot yet include a comparative empirical assessment against competitor approaches. Related work and short summary are presented in §5, and a formally-verified, unabridged version of our formal encoding of Gewirth's theory and argument is provided in the appendix.
Combining Expressive Logics in HOL
We utilize the shallow semantical embeddings (SSE) approach to combining logics. SSE exploits HOL as a metalogic in order to embed the syntax and semantics of some target logics, thereby turning theorem proving systems for HOL into universal reasoning engines [Benzmüller, 2019] . Moreover, an approach drawing upon SSE has been proposed as the foundation for a flexible deontic logic reasoning infrastructure [Benzmüller et al., 2018b] . We thus assess, in some sense, the promises of this framework at hand of a non-trivial, concrete example.
In the following, we present an extract of the embedding of DDL in HOL. Our work thereby significantly extends previous work by Benzmüller et al. [2018a] : Besides adding higher-order quantification, we also extend this embedding to a two-dimensional semantics [Schroeter, 2017] by additionally adding contextual information (contexts of use [Kaplan, 1979; Kaplan, 1989] ). The system platform used to implement this ambitious logic combination is the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant [Nipkow et al., 2002] .
Definition of Types
• w -Type used for worlds (Kaplan's "circumstances of evaluation" or "counterfactual situations").
• e -Type for individuals (entities eligible as agents).
• c -Type for Kaplanian "contexts of use".
• w⇒bool (abbreviated wo) -Type for contents/propositions, which are identified with their truth-sets.
• c⇒wo (abbreviated cwo or just m) -Type for sentence meanings (Kaplan's "character"), which are functions from contexts to contents.
DDL Modal and Deontic Operators
The following Isabelle/HOL commands illustrate the way logical operators in the target logic (enhanced DDL) can be defined as metalogical predicates using lambda expressions of the appropriate arity/type. In what follows, we are using Isabelle/HOL syntax to render axioms, theorems and definitions (providing the appropriate indications when needed). 1 We start by introducing two constants av and pv, which can be seen as reachability relations between worlds, each of type "w⇒w⇒bool" (where av is always a subset of pv). Another constant is ob of type "wo⇒wo⇒bool". It denotes a neighborhood function used to embed the dyadic deontic operator.
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The two definitions below, introduced using Isabelle's keyword "abbreviation", realize the embedding of the different modal box and diamond operators (shown here only for a and ♦ a ). Each of them is embedded as a function from sentence meanings to sentence meanings (type "m⇒m"), and they employ (restricted) quantification over possible worlds, following a Kripke semantics.
where
The following definitions correspond to the semantical embedding of DDL deontic operators in Isabelle/HOL. The first one represents conditional obligations of the form "ϕ must be the case given σ" and is embedded as a dyadic relation (type "m⇒m⇒m"). The second and third represent the so-called "actual" and "ideal" obligations in logic DDL.
Logical Validity (Classical)
The SSE technique also allows us to embed different notions of logical validity: context-dependent modal validity and general validity (modal validity in each context).
where "⌊ϕ⌋ ≡ ∀ c. ⌊ϕ⌋ M c"
Kaplan's Context Features
Kaplan's theory, the "Logic of Demonstratives" [1979] , aims at modeling the behavior of certain context-sensitive linguistic expressions like the pronouns 'I', 'my', 'you', 'he', 'his', 'she', 'it', the demonstrative pronouns 'that', 'this', the adverbs 'here', 'now', 'tomorrow', 'yesterday', the adjectives 'actual', 'present', and others. Such expressions are known as indexicals and so Kaplan's logical system, among others, is usually referred to as a "logic of indexicals". In what follows, we refer to Kaplan's logic as LD: "logic of demonstratives" (according to his seminal work [Kaplan, 1979] ) It is characteristic of an indexical that its content varies with context, i.e. they have a context-sensitive character. Non-indexicals have a fixed character. LD models contextsensitivity by representing contexts as quadruples of features: Time(c) . The agent and the position of context c can be seen as the actual speaker and place of the utterance respectively, while c's world and time stand for the circumstances of evaluation of the expression's content and allow for the interaction of indexicals with alethic and tense modalities respectively. To keep things simple (and relevant for our task) we restrict ourselves to representing a context c as the pair: Agent(c), World(c) and model the functional concepts "Agent" and "World" as uninterpreted logical constants. 4 consts Agent::"c⇒e" -function retrieving the agent corresponding to context c consts World::"c⇒w" -function retrieving the world corresponding to context c
Indexical Validity
Kaplan's notion of (context-dependent) logical truth for a sentence corresponds to its context-sensitive formula (of type "m", i.e. "c⇒w⇒bool") being true in the given context and at its corresponding world.
where "⌊ϕ⌋ c ≡ ϕ c (World c)" -truth in the given context Kaplan's LD notion of logical validity for a sentence requires its truth in all contexts. This notion is also known as indexical validity.
The following lemmas show that indexical validity is indeed weaker than its classical modal counterpart (truth at all worlds for all contexts).
The countermodel computed by the model finder Nitpick [Blanchette and Nipkow, 2010] for the latter lemma consists of one context c 1 and two worlds w 1 and w 2 ; where World(c 1 ) = w 1 and where A holds for c 1 and w 1 , but not for c 1 and w 2 (Nitpick returns further insightful details which we omit here). Below we use Nitpick to show that the interplay between indexical validity and the DDL modal and deontic operators does not result in modal collapse.
Next we show that the necessitation rule does not work for indexical validity (in contrast to classical modal validity as defined for DDL, where the respective rules are indeed implied from the semantical embedding).
The following operator D can be seen as a 'analytic/a priori necessity' operator (to be contrasted to the more traditional alethic necessity). In LD, a sentence being logically (i.e. indexically) valid means its being true a priori: it is guaranteed to be true in every possible context in which it is uttered, even though it may express distinct propositions in different contexts. This correlation between indexical validity and a prioricity has also been claimed in other two-dimensional semantic frameworks [Schroeter, 2017] .
Quite trivially, the necessitation rule works for the combination of indexical validity with the previous operator. This is proven using Isabelle's simp tool (a term-rewriting engine):
Note that D is not part of Kaplan's original system. It has been added by us in order to better highlight some semantic features of our formalization of Gewirth's theory in the next section and for enabling the use of the necessitation rule for drawing inferences.
Quantification
We also enrich our combined logic with first-order and higher-order quantifiers (using a parameterized type: 't):
where "∀ Φ ≡ λc w.∀ x. (Φ x c w)" abbreviation mexists::"('t⇒m)⇒m" ("∃ ")
This definition of embedded parametric quantifiers (which reuses λ-abstraction to avoid the explicit introduction of a new binding mechanism) follows earlier work [Benzmüller and Paulson, 2013] . However, it is defined here for Kaplan's sentence meanings and in this sense constitutes another relevant extension of previous work.
Representing Gewirth's Ethical Theory
In this section we encode and mechanize Gewirth's [1981] ethical theory, respectively, ethical argument, which aims at justifying an upper moral principle called the "Principle of Generic Consistency" (PGC). In a nutshell, according to this principle, any intelligent agent (by virtue of its selfunderstanding as an agent) is rationally committed to asserting that (i) it has rights to freedom and well-being, and (ii) all other agents have those same rights. The argument used by Gewirth to derive the PGC (presented in detail in [Gewirth, 1981; Beyleveld, 1991] ) is by no means trivial and has stirred much controversy in legal and moral philosophy during the last decades. It has also been discussed in political philosophy as an argument for the a priori necessity of human rights. Perhaps more relevant for us, the PGC has lately been proposed as a means to bound the impact of artificial general intelligence (AGI) by András Kornai [2014] . Kornai draws on Gewirth's PGC as the paradigmatic principle which, assuming it can reliably be represented in a machine, will enable the design of a safety mechanism of a mathematical nature that ensures that an AGI will always respect basic human's rights over all other things. This is based on the assumption that such an intelligent agent is able to recognize itself, as well as humans, as agents acting voluntarily on self-chosen purposes, i.e. as what Gewirth calls: prospective purposive agents (PPA). Every agent designed to follow the PGC will thus be deductively committed, on pain of selfcontradiction, to acting in accord with the generic rights (i.e. to freedom and well-being) of all agents. 
Gewirth's Ethical Theory
Gewirth's meta-ethical position is known as moral (or ethical) rationalism. According to it, moral principles are knowable a priori, by reason alone. Immanuel Kant is the most famous figure who has defended such a position. He argued for the existence of upper moral principles (e.g. his "categorical imperative") from which we can reason in a top-down fashion to deduce and evaluate other more concrete maxims and actions. In contrast to Kant, Gewirth derives such upper moral principles by starting from purely logical (i.e. non-moral) considerations alone. The argument for the PGC employs what 5 Our work constitutes a most relevant first step for further assessment of Kornai's claim. E.g. we plan to embody our encoding of Gewirth's theory in virtual agents and devise and conduct respective empirical studies. The merits of the work presented here are however not tied to the validity of Kornai's claim. We illustrate that representation and reasoning with complex ethical theories is meanwhile feasible to an extend as unmatched before. And this is highly relevant for implementing explicit ethical intelligent systems. In the following, we will present some commented extracts of our formal encoding of Gewirth's theory and of the computer-supported verification of the argument leading to the PGC.
Gewirth calls "the dialectically necessary method" within the "internal viewpoint" of an agent. Although the logical inferences leading to the PGC are drawn relative to the reasoning agent, Gewirth [Gewirth, 1981] 
further argues that "the dialectically necessary method propounds the contents of this relativity as necessary ones, since the statements it presents reflect judgements all agents necessarily make on the basis of what is necessarily involved in their actions . . . The statements the method attributes to the agent are set forth as necessary ones in that they reflect what is conceptually necessary to being an agent who voluntarily or freely
acts for purposes he wants to attain." In other words, the "dialectical necessity" of the assertions and inferences made in the argument comes from the definitional features (i.e. conceptual analysis) of the involved notions of agency, purposeful action, obligation, rights, etc. In order to adequately represent this informal notion of a priori dialectical/analytic necessity, we resorted to the formal notion of indexical validity as developed in David Kaplan's logical framework LD (Logic of Demonstratives/Indexicals [Kaplan, 1979; Kaplan, 1989] ).
The cogency of Gewirth's theory will be put to the test in Section 4 by using it to reconstruct his argument (with minor fixes) for the PGC as logically valid. However, we first need to introduce the basic theory itself. To get some inspiration we take a look at the main steps of Gewirth's argument (with original numbering from [Beyleveld, 1991] ):
(1) [Premise] I act voluntarily for some (freely chosen) purpose E (equivalent by definition to: I am a PPA). (2) E is (subjectively) good (i.e. I value E proactively). In his informal proof Gewirth claims that the latter generalization step (from "I" to all agents) is done on purely logical grounds and does not presuppose any kind of universal moral principle, and thus his result is meant to hold with some kind of necessity.
6 Beyleveld [1991, p.1] , author of an authoritative book on Gewirth's theory, puts it this way: "The argument purports to establish the PGC as a rationally necessary proposition with an apodictic status for any PPA equivalent to that enjoyed by the logical principle of noncontradiction itself." In what follows, we provide some meaning postulates 7 for the core ethical concepts used to articulate both the PGC and the argument leading to it (as outlined above). We illustrate how to exploit the expressiveness of our embedded object logic (DDL enhanced with quantifiers and contexts) to intuitively represent and mechanize such a complex ethical theory for the first time in the computer. We also illustrate the utilization of interactive proof assistants (Isabelle/HOL) to assess the argument and to reason with Gewirth's theory.
Agency
Since Isabelle/HOL is a based on a Church's functional type theory we need to assign all terms a type. We give "purposes" the same type as sentence meanings (type 'c⇒w⇒bool' aliased 'm'), so that "acting on a purpose" is represented analogously to having a certain propositional attitude (like "desiring that so and so . . . "). The terms "ActsOnPurpose" and "NeedsForPurpose" obtain functional types and expressions like "(ActsOnPurpose A E)" and "(NeedsForPurpose A P E)" are read as "agent A acts on purpose E" and "agent A needs to have property P in order to reach purpose E". We also define a type alias p for properties, which are functions from individuals to sentence meanings (i.e. p = "e⇒m").
consts ActsOnPurpose:: "e⇒m⇒m" consts NeedsForPurpose:: "e⇒p⇒m⇒m" In Gewirth's argument, an individual with agency (i.e. capable of purposive action) is said to be a PPA (prospective purposive agent). This definition is supplemented with a meaning postulate stating that being a PPA is an essential (i.e. identity-constitutive) property of an individual. Quite interestingly, this postulate entails a kind of ability for a PPA to recognize other PPAs.
8 For instance, if some individual holds itself as a PPA (seen from its own perspective/context 'd') then this individual 'Agent(d)' is considered a PPA from any other agent's perspective/context 'c'.
definition PPA:: "p" where "PPA a ≡ ∃ E. ActsOnPurpose a E" -Definition of PPA axiomatization where
Goodness
Gewirth's concept of (subjective) goodness applies to purposes and is relative to some agent. It is therefore modeled as a binary relation relating an individual (of type 'e') with a purpose (of type 'm'). The axioms below are meaning postulates interrelating the concept of goodness with agency and are given as indexically valid sentences (in Kaplan's sense). 9 In particular, we have noticed the need to postulate a further axiom: "explGood3", which represents the intuitive notion of "seeking the good" by asserting that, from an agent's point of view, necessarily good purposes are not only action motivating, but also entail an instrumental obligation to their realization (but only where possible).
consts Good::"e⇒m⇒m" axiomatization where explGood1: "⌊∀ a P. ActsOnPurpose a P → Good a P⌋ D " explGood2: "⌊∀ P M a. Good a P ∧ NeedsForPurpose a M
Freedom and Well-Being
According to Gewirth, enjoying freedom and well-being (which we take together as the predicate "FWB") is the contingent property which represents the "necessary conditions" or "generic features" of agency (i.e. FWB is always required in order to be able to act on any purpose whatsoever). As before, we take this as an a priori characteristic of FWB and therefore axiomatize it as an indexically valid sentence. The last two axioms postulate that FWB is a contingent property.
consts FWB::"p" -FWB is a property (has type e⇒m) axiomatization where explicationFWB1: "⌊∀ P a. NeedsForPurpose a FWB P⌋
Obligation and Interference
Kant's Law ("ought implies can") plays an important role in Gewirth's argument. 10 We have noticed the need to slightly amend it in order to render the argument as logically valid. The new variant reads as: "ought implies ought to can". Our variation is indeed closer to Gewirth's [1981, p. 91-95] lemma "⌊O i ϕ → ♦ p ϕ⌋" using sem˙5ab by simp 11 axiomatization where OIOAC:
Concerning the concept of interference, we have noticed the need to presume that the existence of an individual b (successfully) interfering with some state of affairs ϕ implies that ϕ cannot possibly be obtained in any of the actually possible situations (and the other way round). This axiom implies that if someone (successfully) interferes with agent a having FWB, then a can no longer possibly enjoy its FWB (and the converse).
consts InterferesWith::"e⇒m⇒m" axiomatization where explicationInterference:
using explicationInterference by blast 12 3.6 Rights and Other-Directed Obligations Gewirth [1981, p.66] points out the existence of a correlation between an agent's own claim rights and other-referring obligations. A claim right is a right which entails duties or obligations for other agents regarding the right-holder (so-called Hohfeldian claim rights in legal theory). We model this concept of claim rights in such a way that an individual a has a (claim) right to having some property ϕ if and only if it is obligatory that every (other) individual b does not interfere with the state of affairs (ϕ a). Since there is no particular individual to whom this directive is addressed, this obligation has been referred to by Gewirth as being "other-directed" (aka. "other-referring") in contrast to "other-directing" obligations which entail a moral obligation for some particular subject [Beyleveld, 1991, p. 41,51] . This latter distinction is essential to Gewirth's argument.
definition RightTo::"e⇒(e⇒m)⇒m" where
Now that all axioms of the theory are in place, we need to show that they are indeed logically consistent. For this we use Isabelle's model finder Nitpick to compute a corresponding model having one context, one individual and two worlds.
lemma True nitpick[satisfy, card c = 1, card e = 1, card w = 2] oops -model found (not shown here)
Reasoning with Gewirth's Ethical Theory
The PGC can be seen as a particular variant (or emendation) of the golden rule: treating others as one's self would wish to be treated. A self-acknowledged agent (i.e. a PPA) would read the PGC as a moral commandment: "I ought to act in accord with the generic rights of my recipients as well as of myself" [Gewirth, 1981, p. 153] . Urging a fellow human being to obey such a principle without having explained its deeper rationale will presumably at best elicit an absent-minded, cursory acknowledgment. The difficulty here lies not only in the lack of understanding or agreement of what the given words mean (what is a "generic right"?), but also in the addressee's lack of 'immersion' in the underlying conceptual framework and the inferential practices behind such a principle (an unaware addressee wouldn't be able to infer a third-party obligation from a right claim). In short, any moral principle qua sentence makes best sense in the context of the background theory from which it is obtained as a well-founded part.
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This situation is not much different for machines. In order to correctly interpret and apply an ethical principle, we need to (i) determine the meaning of its constituent concepts (action/agency, right, freedom and well-being, etc.); and (ii) determine the meaning of other relevant concepts (goodness, necessity, interference, obligation, etc.) playing a role in its articulation (and justification) within the underlying theory. Talk of meanings can be obscure, so let us put it in modeltheoretical terms: The set of models of the logical theory has to be constrained to properly fit the target conceptualization (i.e. to only entail intended models). These constraints are set by meaning postulates, i.e. axioms and definitions. Their adequacy can be assessed by studying the extend to which they enable the validation (or invalidation) of candidate theorems 13 A point made by Quine [1960] in his holistic view of meaning.
(or non-theorems). As is already known, the main theorem we aim at validating here is the PGC, suitably paraphrased as: Every PPA has a claim right to its freedom and well-being.
theorem PGC: shows -proof shown in the appendix "∀ C. ⌊PPA (Agent C) → (RightTo (Agent C) FWB)⌋ C " In Sections 2 and 3, besides from formally articulating Gewirth's theory, we have used some of Isabelle's proof methods (simp, blast, etc. ) and the Nitpick model finder to verify some relevant inferences and to guarantee consistency, thus the theory's adequacy has already partly be assessed. In addition, we have used a combination of interactive and automated theorem proving to reconstruct Gewirth's argument for the PGC as logically valid by formally proving it within the complex logical framework built so far. We thus contribute an exemplary case study illustrating how to reason with highly-expressive formal representations of complex, natural-language ethical theories by harnessing the power of higher-order theorem provers (drawing on the SSE approach). In the argument's reconstruction (see appendix), some of the intermediate inference steps leading to the main conclusion (PGC) have indeed been hinted at by automated tools. In particular, some missing implicit premises (not considered in Gewirth's original argument) have been uncovered, namely the explications of the concepts of goodness and interference and the amendment to Kant's Law: "ought implies ought to can". Note that the mechanized argument matches the granularity-level as can also be found in human constructed informal arguments, and all the sub-arguments (sub-proofs) can automatically be found by automated theorem proving technology. Moreover, the whole proof as presented can be automatically verified using a standard laptop in under a second. (We refer the reader to the appendix for proof details.)
Related Work and Summary
We achieve significant improvements over related work such as Bringsjord et al. [2005] : (i) due the use of enriched DDL (enabled by our higher-order meta-logic) we are not suffering from contrary-to-duty issues, (ii) we make use of truly higher-order encodings as required for the adequate modeling of the PGC, (iii) we overcome unintuitive, machine-oriented formula representations, and (iv) we do not stop with supporting proof automation, but combine it with means for intuitive user interaction. Combinations of these improvements also apply to more recent related work such as [Govindarajulu and Bringsjord, 2018] , [Hooker and Kim, 2018] and [Pereira and Saptawijaya, 2016] . They are not applicable to the PGC without considering significant simplifications (and accepting e.g. contrary-to-duty issues is potentially very dangerous).
Utilizing a semantical embedding of a suitable combination of expressive non-classical logics in meta-logic HOL, an ambitious ethical theory, Gewirth's PGC, has exemplarily been encoded and mechanized on the computer. Our methodology supports both highly intuitive representation of and interactive-automated reasoning with the encoded theory. Automated theorem provers have even helped to reveal some hidden issues in Gewirth's argument. The presented methodology is motivating research in different, albeit related, directions: (i) for conducting analogous formal assessments of further ambitious ethical theories, and (ii) for progressing with the implantation of explicit ethical reasoning competencies in future intelligent autonomous systems by adapting stateof-the-art theorem proving technology and by combining the expertise of different research communities.
